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1). The value of publicness 
This chapter investigates how and why the topic of the public sphere, or 
publicness more broadly, is important for the ways in which political 
geography conceptualises democratic politics. Democracy is a system for 
making binding, legitimate decisions, one which puts a premium on the 
principle of ‘rule by the many’. The idea of the public sphere needs to be 
approached with this understanding of democracy in mind: “Democratic 
theory focuses on accountability and responsiveness in the decision-making 
process; theories of the public sphere focus on the role of public 
communication in facilitating or hindering this process” (Ferree et al 2002, 
289). It is important to emphasise this relationship between decision-making 
and communication in understandings of democratic publicness. In geography, 
some fields of research – electoral geography, in particular – focus upon the 
decision-mechanisms through which preferences are translated into clear 
expressions of the public will. But elections are moments of closure, and they 
communicate remarkably little information about what people actually think, 
feel, and favour. Geographical research heavily inflected by cultural theory 
tends to think that these sorts of occasions are poor approximations of genuine 
democratic politics. They give greater weight to the value of non-closure, on-
going contestation, and the free play of difference in their accounts of what 
democracy is all about. In so far as it considers the problem of binding public 
authority at all, this line of work tends to fall back on a vocabulary of 
ideological legitimation and coercion. But this has the unfortunate side-effect 
of encouraging the idea that publicness is a value in and of itself, rather than 
being a means to an end as well.  
This chapter tries to steer a path between the over-emphasis on either the 
intrinsic or instrumental value of publicness to democratic politics. Section 2 
sets out just what is at stake in thinking about the value of publicness for 
democratic theory, a value that turns on a set of paradoxes between autonomy 
and obligation, liberty and collective action; Section 3 considers whether there 
is a distinctive geography implied by the centrality of publicness to democratic 
theory and practice, and Section 4 argues for a clear distinction between public 
action and public spaces;  Section 5 then outlines an understanding of the 
parasitical qualities of democratic publicness; Section 6 considers some 
questions of the style of public action.     
 
2). What kinds of things are public(s)? 
Just what is meant by ‘public’ in discussions about the public sphere, public 
space, the public realm, or public life? To focus our thoughts on this question 
of definition, let’s start by asking two questions which might help us clarify 
what is at stake in these debates. 
Firstly, we can ask “what kind of thing is a public”? One way of thinking 
about publicness is to assume that the word public is a noun. Public can be the 
name for a certain type of collective subject: ‘the public’. In this sense, ‘the 
public’ can appear as roughly synonymous with other entities, such as ‘the 
people’, ‘the community’, or even ‘the nation’. The public, then, can be 
thought of as all the members of a given society, perhaps specifically all of 
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these people gathered together over issues of shared concern. But just what 
would these issues of shared concern be?  
This leads to our second question, which implies a different way of thinking 
about publicness: “what kind of thing is public?” This suggests that publicness 
is a characteristic that is ascribed to some types of phenomena, but not to 
others. We might think that decisions about the level of general taxation are a 
matter of public concern, and so might be the decision over where to locate a 
new airport. But it would be a surprise if many people thought that my 
decision to collect stamps rather than butterflies is a public matter. The latter 
might reasonably seem to be none of anyone else’s business. A large part of 
what is at stake in deciding just what sort of thing is a public matter has to do 
with deciding what should remain personal or private matters.  
So ‘public’ might be used to refer to the subject of concerted action, or it 
might be used to refer to the object of concerted action. In both respects, the 
value ascribed to publicness is closely related to the principle that some issues 
gain their importance both from affecting and being addressed by people 
acting together in concert.  
But there is another sense of ‘public’, one which refers to the idea that some 
things are carried out in the open and are open to participation by all comers. 
When we combine the first two senses of public with this third idea, then we 
begin to get at why publicness might be so important to theories of democracy. 
In political theory, the value of democracy and democratic citizenship is 
closely related to the idea of “public reason”. This is the idea that democracy 
acquires its value not just by embodying the preferences or will of the many, 
but also by involving free and open discussion and debates about the means 
and ends to which public power, such as that of the state, should be deployed. 
The American political philosopher John Rawls (1993, 213) argues that public 
reason “is public in three ways”. Firstly, “as the reasons of citizens as such, it 
is the reason of the public”. This is the first sense of ‘public’ noted above, the 
idea that the public is a collective subject, composed of citizens engaged in 
debate and deliberation. Secondly, “its subject is the good of the public and 
matters of fundamental justice”. This is the second sense of ‘public’ above, the 
idea that some objects of concern are public by virtue of mattering to everyone 
and affecting the basic structure of a polity. And thirdly, “its nature and 
content is public”. By suggesting that public reason is public by virtue of 
being conducted in the open, Rawls adds in the third aspect to the 
understanding of publicness noted already. Public refers not just to a subject of 
action, and not just to an object of action, but it also refers to a particular 
medium through which action should be conducted. This chapter argues that, 
in fundamental respects, this dimension of publicity, which relates to the 
medium of action, plays a constitutive role in shaping who counts as a public 
and what counts as a public matter. In developing this argument, I will also 
argue for a reorientation of the spatial imagination that geographers should 
bring to the normative analysis of democratic publicness.   
What does it mean to suggest that the subjects and objects of publicness are 
constituted through the mediums of publicity? Well, just look at the ways in 
which ‘the public’ makes its appearance felt. People speak about what ‘the 
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public’ thinks, feels, and favours, and when they do so, they tend to have 
recourse to the results of elections, or statistical surveys, or opinion polls. 
These technical mediums are the ways in which the voice of the public is often 
expressed. For example, we might think of a public as something which is 
made through mediums like public consultation procedures (Davies 2006,  
Barnes et al 2003) or public opinion polls (Herbst 1996, Fishkin 1995). One 
might even say that publics are ‘assembled’, in the sense that that they are put 
together through various combinations of devices, procedures, things, and 
mediums (Latour and Wiebel 2005).  
This conceptualisation of the meaning of ‘the public’ may appear to be a 
little dangerous. It invites the suspicion that any given expression of public 
will, opinion, or preference, is just a fabrication made in the interests of those 
who claim to speak in the publics’ name or interests, and that behind these 
fabrications there lay the genuine, untapped will of the people. Some of the 
worst excesses of our times have been made in the name of populist 
movements who claim to embody the singular will of a unified people against 
the inauthentic, divisive impostures of parties, experts, elites, or other 
representatives. So, one reason to embrace the mediated appearance of publics 
is to cultivate a healthy scepticism about any given claim to embody ‘the’ 
public will or interest.  
Part of the vital value of publicness to the life of democracy lies in his 
double relationship: a public seems to be a singular collective subject, but by 
the mode of its appearance, any public also seems divided against itself, 
thereby opening a space in which claims and counter claims as to its true 
opinions, feelings, wishes, and interests can proliferate. We should embrace 
the resulting sense that ‘the public’ could never actually appear in its own 
right, without some sort of prosthetic support. The philosopher Jacques 
Derrida (1992, 88) argues that ‘the public’ can show no sign of life “without a 
certain medium”. He argues that ‘the public’ does not, cannot, and should be 
expected to speak in its own voice, in the first person. Rather, it is only cited 
and spoken for. 
The fabricated qualities of the public are at the core of debates in democratic 
theory. Some strands of contemporary liberal political theory often worry that 
no procedure for arriving at the public will – voting procedures being the 
model - can actually fairly and rationally embody all the preferences of the 
governed (Dummett 1984). There is a worry that any attempt to arrive at such 
decision mechanisms threatens to impose a tyrannical form of rule over 
autonomous individuals. Although not all liberal theory invests unqualified 
trust in the market, there is a strain of liberalism that is led towards arguing 
that the ideal expression of the general, public will is the ‘spontaneous order’ 
created by a perfectly competitive market. On this interpretation, the link 
between democracy and public communication is based on a thin model of 
information-processing, rather than in terms of the exposure of opinions to 
argument, challenge and justification.   
This interpretation puts a premium on respecting the privately-formed, 
autonomous preferences of individuals from undue interference. But it is 
subject to all sorts of objections. Primary amongst them is that it supposes that 
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autonomy is a wholly private value. But it is quite plausible to suppose that 
people’s preferences might just be accommodations with existing patterns of 
inequality. Preferences, in short, are adaptive. Jon Elster (1983) calls this the 
“sour grapes” phenomenon, to capture the idea that people adjust their 
preferences, expectations, and wants in relation to the availability or 
unavailability of different goods. People deprived of some options, because of 
lack of resources or information, may end up not wanting the things they have 
been deprived of. Their continuing deprivation cannot therefore be justified on 
the grounds that they express no preference for these things, since the absence 
of the preference is the result of the initial deprivation: “why should the choice 
between feasible options only take account of individual preferences if people 
tend to adjust their aspirations to their possibilities?” (Elster 1983, 109).  
To suppose that democracy simply means respecting the expression of 
private preferences formed in such circumstances is to risk condoning social 
injustice in the name of claiming to do justice to autonomy. So-called 
‘deliberative democrats’ argue that it is a category error to suppose that 
democracy is simply an aggregative mechanism through which the ‘pre-
political’ preferences of individuals are added up to establish the general will 
(Sunstein 1997). For them, only a process of preference formation which takes 
place in the open, through the medium of public debate and discussion, 
approaches democratic legitimacy, because this exposes people to more 
information and forces them to take account of the perspectives of others. 
From this perspective, then, autonomous preferences are only normatively 
valid if they are formed in the context of a robust and diverse process of public 
deliberation. Here, then, we have a much stronger, thicker notion of 
deliberative public communication as quite basic to the functioning of 
democracy.  
These two positions can be called a broadly ‘liberal’ one, and a broadly 
‘republican’ one. They represent two different, but intertwined positions on 
the qualities of public expression in the long tradition of democratic theory 
(Elster 1997). On the one hand, there is a market model, one that privileges a 
liberal understanding of the primacy of individual rational choices aggregated 
through markets. On the other hand, there is a forum model, one which is 
associated with traditions of civic republican thought, which privileges the 
value of collective deliberation as a means of arriving at expressions of the 
general will. From the first perspective, the main task is to find the best 
mechanisms for discovering what the raw data of public opinion actually is. 
Elections might be thought of as one way of doing this, scientific polling 
another, or perhaps referenda. From the second perspective, the challenge is to 
find the best, most just and justifiable mechanism not for discovering but for 
forming and making public opinion. This perspective presumes that only 
opinions and preferences arrived at in public, through the medium of public 
debate, should be ascribed the value of being ‘democratic’.   
I am broadly sympathetic to the latter position. But we shouldn’t dismiss the 
liberal perspective too quickly. It does address a key dilemma in democratic 
theory. There is something quite compelling about the liberal respect for the 
autonomy of private preferences. It is guided by an admirable respect for the 
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pluralism of opinions and preferences, as well as by a deep suspicion of the 
idea that some people should decide that some other people don’t know what 
is in their own best interest (see Goodin 2002). The republican image of 
transformative public deliberation seems compelling because it provides a 
picture of self-less, concerned citizens able to act in the general interest. It is 
grounded in a telling critique of how the liberal position can inadvertently lead 
to the reproduction of serious injustice and the diminution of real autonomy. 
But it is not without its own problems. In particular, the republican position 
can underestimate the genuine importance of privacy as a condition for the 
sorts of virtuous citizenship it speaks on behalf of (Squires 1994).  
Both the liberal and the republican viewpoints agree that preferences should 
be the basis of political life, but then we reach a conundrum: is it justifiable to 
intervene to reshape people’s preferences and tastes, in light of the ‘sour 
grapes’ phenomenon for example, without risking doing serious harm? A 
classical liberal position would err on the side of caution here, worrying about 
the intrusive potential of concerted efforts at forming preferences. However, 
across a wide spectrum of contemporary political thought, a pressing concern 
is whether efforts to shape tastes and preferences are legitimate: How can they 
be justified? What means they should use? Who should pursue these efforts? 
And to what areas they should be limited? This is a particularly acute problem 
for traditions of left-wing political thought, which have in the past often paid 
scant attention to the dilemmas of squaring collective action and individual 
autonomy that liberalism has to be given credit for keeping at the forefront of 
democratic theory. As this chapter develops its argument about publicness, 
spatiality, and democracy, it is therefore worth keeping in mind what Claus 
Offe (1997, 89) identifies as the key challenge for progressive political 
thought today:  
“to develop arguments which, while respecting individual freedom of 
preference formation and the pursuit of preferences in the realms of 
markets, politics, and private life, also provide justification for a wide 
range of taste-shaping and taste-discriminating interventions by 
democratic governments which are seen as valuable for themselves or 
instrumentally indispensable for the sake of maintaining and furthering 
such collective values of solidarity, welfare, autonomy, deliberation, and 
democracy itself”.  
As we will see, the value of publicness to democracy derives in large part from 
the ways in which it provides mediums for working through this challenge in 
ways that respect the equally compelling imperatives of facilitating concerted, 
legitimate action around issues of shared public concern, while respecting the 
pluralism of citizens’ values, opinions, and life projects.  
There is an irreducible tension between finding ways of making collective 
decisions which are broadly legitimate in the eyes of citizens and which 
accord to reasonable principles of justice, while also ensuring that people are 
allowed to carry on as much of their lives as is deemed appropriate without 
undue interference, obstruction, or approbation from sources of authority. It 
should be noted that these two imperatives are not two poles of a continuum; 
nor do they serve as the outer limits to one another; nor are they simply in 
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contradiction. They are, in fact, internally related. The democratic legitimacy 
of collective decisions is supposed, in principle, to depend on the freely given 
consent of citizens, and yet one purpose of collective rule is to cultivate the 
flourishing of autonomous, active citizens whose consent is, indeed, freely 
given or withheld rather than coerced.  
 
3). Setting the public sphere adrift 
We have established the idea that, one way or another, publics are constituted 
in part through the mediums of their representation. The next question we 
need to ask is whether there is any special relationship between the values 
ascribed to ‘the public’ or ‘publicness’ and particular spaces, places, or 
geographical configurations.  
To put my own cards on the table straight away, I think we should follow 
Derrida, who doesn’t think that the public does have any proper place: “Does 
it take place? Where is it given to be seen, and as such? The wandering of its 
proper body is also the ubiquity of a specter” (Derrida 1992, 87). But this 
image of the ghostly quality of the public, cut adrift from any proper location, 
runs against the grain of most research in geography. Geographers tend to 
argue that there are, in fact, some places, spaces, and spatial configurations 
that are peculiarly valuable as scenes of genuine public life and authentic 
public expression. I want to argue against this claim, on the grounds that it 
fails to register the intrinsic value of publicness in itself, as well as the 
instrumental value of publicness to the functioning of democratic rule, and is 
therefore poorly suited to thinking creatively about the spatialities through 
which equally compelling imperatives can be played off against each other.   
One place to start investigating the possible relationships between 
publicness and geography is in the rather arcane tradition of legal reasoning 
known as Public Forum doctrine. Public Forum doctrine is an important aspect 
of First Amendment jurisprudence in the United States of America, one means 
through which the constitutional legal system decides upon what counts as 
‘speech’ that is worthy of protection from unwarranted government regulation. 
Public Forum doctrine is interesting because it defines some types of 
expression as protected ‘speech’ by virtue of where they are uttered. Some 
spaces, according to this tradition, are defined as ‘public’ because they are 
traditionally defined as offering unfettered opportunities to speakers for 
addressing other people on matters of broad, general concern. In guaranteeing 
that some spaces should remain open to all speakers, public forum doctrine 
enforces on citizens an obligation to be exposed to issues and views “that 
would otherwise escape attention, and that would not have been chosen before 
the fact” (Sunstein, 2001, 196).  
The interesting thing about Public Forum doctrine is this functional 
definition of what counts as a public space. This is potentially quite radical, 
since it implies all sorts of spaces and places could in principle be defined as 
public, if they meet the criterion of providing opportunities to address others 
on matters of common interest. The problem with Public Forum doctrine, 
though, is that it tends to restrict its definition of such spaces to the ones 
traditionally defined as public forums by eighteenth and nineteenth century 
  
8
 
common law – street corners, public squares, parks, and so on. In practice, 
recent First Amendment law has tended to restrict the definition of public 
forums to classic spaces like streets and parks, rather than extend them to 
include shopping malls, airports, or television stations.  
The deployment of Public Forum doctrine is just one example of the 
widespread assumption that the value of publicness is best expressed by 
spatial relationships of close physical proximity. It is often supposed that, 
ideally, a public space should conform as closely as possible to the 
configurations of face-to-face interactions. This is a problem for both 
normative and empirical reasons. Let me explain why, by way of an example 
from geography.  
The cultural geographer Don Mitchell (2003) has written extensively about 
the legal regulation of public spaces in the United States. There are two 
important points that Mitchell makes. Firstly, the value of the idea of the 
public sphere lays in the idea that politics is legitimated as democratic by 
virtue of being embedded in forms of inter-subjective communicative action. 
Secondly, if democracy requires opportunities for communicative interactions 
between citizens, then this means that geography and publicness are strongly 
connected. Mitchell combines these two points by defining a public space as a 
“place within which a political movement can stake out the space that allows it 
to be seen. In public space, political organisations can represent themselves to 
a larger population” (Mitchell 1995, 115).  
This definition nicely captures the idea that publicness has something to do 
with communicating with others. Mitchell argues that this definition supports 
a sharp distinction between what he call ‘real’ public spaces and ‘virtual’ 
public spaces. ‘Real’ public spaces turn out to be spatial contexts of face-to-
face interaction like street corners, parks, and public squares. ‘Virtual’ public 
spaces, like TV, radio, or the internet, are understood to be less authentic, 
secondary sites for communicating with others.  
Mitchell is hardly alone in arguing that discussions of the ‘public sphere’ 
need to take more attention of ‘real’ and ‘material’ spaces of public 
interaction. For example, it is a commonplace of geographers’ discussions of 
the influential work of Jürgen Habermas (1989) to complain that his notion of 
the public sphere has only a weak, metaphorical reference to material spaces 
and places (Goheen 1998, Howell 1993, Mitchell 1995). Habermas 
emphasises all sorts of communicative practices of talking, discoursing, and 
deliberating in his account of the public sphere. Geographers, in contrast, 
claim that what we really need to do is focus attention on the ‘materiality’ of 
public space.  
This line of criticism takes us in the wrong direction. It misses the point 
about what might be the problem with metaphors like the public sphere, the 
public realm, public domain, or the public sector.  
The problem is not that these are spatial metaphors. It is that they are spatial 
metaphors.  
They are, more precisely, metaphors that conjure up images of contained, 
circumscribed spaces. By thinking that these should just be made more ‘real’, 
provided with more precise ‘material’ reference points like streets or parks, 
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geographers actually end up inadvertently compounding what is the main 
problem in Habermas’ original account of the public sphere. In reconstructing 
eighteenth-century public spheres as an ideal form, Habermas did not ignore 
the geographical dimensions of public life at all. He told a story all about the 
circulation of pamphlets, newspapers, and novels through spatially extended 
networks of communication. One enduring lesson of his work is the idea that 
the space of publicness is a circulatory space. But Habermas sees the 
circulation of written texts as simply a secondary, additive means for 
continuing a face-to-face conversation. This ideal of the conversational quality 
of public communication assumes that any written communication, once sent 
out into the world, always reaches its intended destination, is received as it 
was intended, and is thereby integrated back into a set of convivial, familiar 
relations.  
Habermas provides us with an image of the public sphere as a circulatory 
space of communication. We do not need to ‘ground’ this image in ‘real’ or 
‘material’ spaces. Quite the contrary, this gesture detracts from the really 
important insight in Habermas’ work, which draws our attention to the degree 
to which a public sphere is all about the process of discoursing. But, in order 
to think about the spatialities of discoursing, we do need to suspend the 
presumption in Habermas’ original account that circulation is a circular, 
tightly bound process (see Lee and LiPuma 2002). It might be better thought 
of as a process of scattering and dispersal. One problem with all the spatial 
metaphors noted above is, certainly, that they fail to capture “the mobile, 
elusive, and problematic character of publicness” (Newman 2005, 2). But 
more than this, if we take seriously the idea that the medium of publicness is 
discourse, then we should also take seriously the degree to which publicness is 
a process: it’s something people do, rather than a space they inhabit.  
And just what is this process of discoursing in public? Above all, it a 
process of addressing others, and of being addressed by them. If publicness 
has a spatiality, then it resides nowhere else than in the treacherous and 
promising space that is enacted by throwing words, signs, and tokens out into 
the world (cf. Arendt 1958, 177).  
What difference does it make to talk about the public sphere in terms of 
circulatory spaces of address? And why does it matter to think of publicness in 
terms of scattering and dispersal rather than ‘material’ and ‘real’ spaces of 
urban life? In particular, why does this matter to thinking about the 
relationships between publicness and democracy?  
Well, there are two reasons.  
Firstly, the idea that city streets, public parks, or other spaces of face-to-face 
relations actually serve as the primary scenes for public interaction and 
communication amongst members of large, complex societies seems a little 
out-of-date. Sticking closely to Mitchell’s own definition of public space – 
places that provide opportunities to be seen and represent oneself to audiences 
– suggests that all sorts of spaces can, in fact as well as in principle, serve this 
function. In terms of the relationship with democratic decision-making, there 
is no good reason to suppose that streets and parks are, in principle or practice, 
privileged public spaces:  
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“They are not the only or even the most important places for 
communicative activity. Other areas – perhaps mailboxes, probably 
railroad stations and airports, certainly broadcasting stations – are the 
modern equivalents of streets and parks” (Sunstein 1995, 102).  
It is these spaces of distanciated, mediated communication which are the most 
‘material’ spaces for public democratic communication, if by material we 
mean the most relevant, the ones most pertaining to the issue at hand - which 
is the opportunity for addressing people where they are to be found. The 
geographer Paul Adams (1992) captures this nicely when he describes 
television as a ‘gathering place’ for modern citizens. One can over-do this sort 
of idea, but it’s importance lies in recognising that the places where potential 
addressees for communications on matters of public concern are to be found 
aren’t, after all, places at all. They are stretched-out, complex networks of 
circulation. Elsewhere, Adams (1998) distinguishes between types of 
communication mediums on the basis of their different network qualities. This 
is one line of investigation that geographers might pursue in thinking about the 
geographies of public space.  Different infrastructures of circulation and 
communication have different formal features that encourage and enable 
certain styles of interaction more than others, some of which may conform to a 
lesser or greater degree to different norms of publicity or privacy (see Gaonakr 
and Povinelli 2003).   
The second reason why we should be suspicious of invocations of ‘real’ or 
‘material’ public spaces is that this fails to accurately register the ways in 
which spaces like streets and parks actually function in contentious politics. 
One of the features of modern social movement politics is the deployment of 
what is sometimes called strategic dramaturgy, or theatrical styles of protest 
that enact claims and grievances, often in non-deliberative ways. The aim of 
these strategies is to demonstrate the size and intensity of a campaigns’ 
support, and to attract public attention (Tilly 1994). The reason such 
movements organise their protests in places like Washington D.C., or around 
Westminster Palace in London, or in the cities where major international 
diplomatic meetings like the G8 or WTO are held, is because these are the 
stages upon which they can project their presence to wide audiences through 
the mediums of newspaper, radio, and television media. In a sense, such 
protest events temporarily enact city streets or parks as public spaces. That is, 
they use them to address others with the aim of attracting attention.  
These days, then, the supposedly ‘real’ and ‘material’ spaces that 
geographers like so much  only ever function as ‘public spaces’ when they are 
embedded in more extensive social networks and technological relations that 
project outwards from any scene of contained interaction (see Adams 1996, 
Barry 2000, Calhoun 1998). And it is worth noting that, contrary to Adams’ 
comforting image of ‘gathering’, the public significance of electronically 
mediated communication inheres in their qualities as mediums of 
dissemination. Radio and television provide the opportunity to address others 
without being able to guarantee that this address will arrive at its intended 
destination, or any destination at all (Scannell 1995). And in that, they help us 
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recognise the public potentialities that inhere in any and all modes of 
communication, irrespective of their medium.  
These are two empirical reasons for being suspicious of geographers’ 
disciplinary preference for ‘real’, ‘material’ public spaces when it comes to 
making sense of ideas about the public sphere and democracy. But they both 
lead to a more fundamental point. Even ideally, these types of spatial 
archetypes – streets, parks, and the like - shouldn’t be thought of as the best 
analogues with which to think about the normative issues at stake in 
discussions of publicness and democracy. Sticking only to the definition of a 
public space as any space which provides opportunities for addressing and 
interacting with other people, then there is no reason to assume that such 
spaces are exemplified by shared locales of spatial or temporal co-presence. 
When we add the sense that public communication is important to democratic 
theory and practice only in so far as it can articulate with mechanisms of 
collective decision-making, then we can even say that the ‘real’, ‘material’ 
spaces that geographers favour when they write about the public sphere are not 
necessarily material to the relation between publicness and democracy. If we 
take material in the sense of being most relevant to the case in hand, then 
spaces of physically co-present interaction are not, on their own, the most 
important arenas for the articulation of public communicative action with 
binding, collective decisions.  
 
4). Public action and public space 
The analysis in the preceding section leads to a preliminary conclusion: we 
need to stop thinking of publicness primarily as a type of space, and instead 
focus on the type of action that is attributed the status ‘public’. Some work in 
geography has begun to explore the contingent relationship between various 
sorts of public action and the types of spaces in and across which such action 
takes place. Lynn Staeheli (1996), in her research on women’s activism in the 
United States, shows how public action in the sense of concerted citizenly 
action oriented to matters of general interest can take place in putatively 
private spaces like the home. Likewise, Sophie Watson (2004) shows in her 
work on various forms of civic association in the UK that public spaces can 
be, sometimes must be, fleeting, hidden, and temporary. And Murray Low 
(2003) shows that one of the most important forms of public action we 
undertake as citizens – voting – is only of any value as a public act by virtue 
of being undertaken in secret. Each of these examples underscores the idea 
that the democratic value of publicness lies in certain sorts of action, and that 
these actions are not, actually or conceptually, contained within particular 
configurations of place, space or territory.  
We might also learn from media and communications studies, a field with 
its own well-developed sensitivity to questions of space and place (Couldry 
and McCarthy 2004). For example, Samarajiva and Shields (1997, 451-542) 
capture the way in which the criteria for distinguishing between ‘public space’ 
and ‘private space’ are not ‘spatial’ at all, in the sense of referring to locational 
categories, but are based on the distinction between different types of 
interaction:  
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“Public spaces are characterised by a relative openness to initiation of 
communication by others, and private spaces are characterised by a 
relative closedness to initiation of communication” (Samarajiva and 
Shields 1997, 541-542).  
Notice that this definition does not only define publicness by reference to 
opportunities for speakers to communicate to others. It also emphasises the 
importance of variable dispositions to be willingly on the receiving end of 
uninitiated expressions from others in defining the nature of democratic 
publicness.  
One thing this definition reminds us of is the importance of values like 
privacy and autonomy in mediating the relationship between democracy and 
publicness. There are all sorts of occasions when we might quite rightfully not 
want to be open to unwanted, unexpected encounters with others. Another 
important point about this definition is that it defines the publicness of a space 
by its internal, formal qualities of address and reception, and not by reference 
to the conditions of access to any space. This is a more contentious point. It 
directs our attention to the intimate connection between notions of publicness, 
democracy, and relationships of property ownership and commodification. 
Private space has been traditionally defined as an important realm for the 
cultivation of the essential virtues of democratic citizenry – of tolerance, 
criticism, and mutual trust, for example. Staeheli and Mitchell (2004) observe 
that contemporary societies are increasingly characterised by a steady erosion 
of the forms of privacy that should remain important resources for wider forms 
of social engagement, as states and corporations extend their capacities of 
surveillance. But the private realm is also sometimes defined as a realm of 
negative freedom, upon which the state cannot properly impinge. This second 
sense of privacy raises questions regarding the degree to which rights of 
private property are consistent with values of democracy and democratic 
publicness. If the erosion of privacy is one threat to the health of democracy, 
Staeheli and Mitchell also identify another in the steady privatisation of public 
space, by which they mean the process by which seemingly more and more 
activities which are of public importance are re-organised according to the 
economic imperatives of private commodity production and consumption. In 
particular, more and more putatively public spaces are being commodified; 
access to them is more and more tightly controlled by private organisations, 
and is often explicitly based on the ability to pay (Low and Smith 2005). This 
is true of both ‘real’ spaces like city centres or shopping malls, and also 
‘virtual’ spaces like television and radio.  
Both of these ways of controlling access to spaces is, by definition, 
exclusionary. But it is worth noting that on Samarajiva and Shields’ definition 
of the publicness of spaces, one that emphasises patterns of interaction rather 
than conditions of access, this is not necessarily a sign of a diminution of their 
public value at all:  
“The ‘publicness’ of a space depends on openness to initiation of 
communication among inhabitants rather than the terms and conditions 
of access to that space”. (1997, 542) 
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Just because one might have to pay a fee to enter a ‘real’ or ‘virtual’ space, 
does not necessarily vitiate its quality as a space for public action. Now, this 
flies in the face of a great deal of research in geography, which tracks the 
privatization and commodification of space and automatically concludes that 
this is equivalent to a shrinking of the public realm.  
My point is not that we should not be concerned by such processes. But we 
should be clear about what it is about ‘publicness’ that we consider to be of 
value before we jump to the conclusion that structural changes in the design or 
regulation of public infrastructures are necessarily destructive of public life. In 
particular, we should remember that the value of public communication, when 
it comes to questions of democracy, is not an end in itself. Public 
communication is considered valuable by reference to the idea that decision-
making in a democracy should be undertaken within a broader web of 
relations of deliberation, oversight, and scrutiny (Emirbayer and Sheller 1999, 
Keane 2004, Przeworski et al 1999, Young 1999). The commercialisation and 
commodification of spaces of putatively public communications might, on 
these grounds, have much more ambivalent implications for public life and 
democratic politics than is often supposed, since there is no a priori reason 
why these sorts of spaces cannot sustain cultures of deliberation, self-
expression, and accountability (see Barnett 2003).  
We can begin to see why a functional definition of publicness - one which 
focuses on types of action that are in some sense ‘public’ - is important for 
understanding the relationship between publicness, spatiality, and democracy. 
Public communication is important to democracy because, and not in spite of, 
the fact that democracy is a system of rule, that is, a mechanism for making 
binding decisions in a context of irreducible pluralism in opinions and non-
reconcilable differences of interest. Action that is public by virtue of what it 
considers, as well by virtue of  who is drawn together to deliberate over these 
objects of concern, is not found only in locations like streets, parks, or other 
exemplars of public forums. Public action can take place anywhere. It has no 
proper place at all.  
 
5). Parasitical publics 
There is a strong strand of thought that defines democratic publicity primarily 
in terms of the intrinsic value of a distinctive type of sociability. Often 
enough, interaction in urban social life is the privileged analogue of such 
public activity. The attractiveness of this sociability model of publicness lies 
in its ability to model the possibility that people with plural interests and 
different identities can come together as a collectivity (Young 1990). This 
strand of thought is very good at explicating the idea that a crucial aspect of a 
vibrant democratic public life is our exposure to the identities and perspectives 
of others (Bridge 2004). But the problem with making urban spaces of 
sociability, surprise, and pluralistic encounter into the exemplary models of 
publicness is that this completely ignores the sense in which, in democratic 
theory, publicness is instrumentally related to maintaining the legitimacy of 
binding collective decision-making. 
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In this section, I want to develop the idea that public action has no proper 
place at all. To do so, I will introduce the arguments of two very different 
writers on the theme of publicness: Michael Warner, a literary theorist who is 
one of the most acute commentators on contemporary theories and practices of 
publicness; and John Dewey, a doyen of mid-twentieth century American 
liberalism, and one of the key theorists of the public life in modern social 
theory. I deploy the arguments of both writers to explicate the idea that 
publicness is always and only ever derivative of other spaces, other concerns, 
and other social relations from which it emerges, and which it in turn helps to 
reconstitute and transform. Together, Warner and Dewey enable us to 
appreciate that thinking about the equally compelling importance of intrinsic 
and instrumental aspects of publicness requires us to let go of the idea that 
public space is either ‘material’ or best modelled on scenes of co-present 
interaction.    
 
5.i). Publics as communities of strangers  
Warner focuses on the distinctively, and irreducible, discursive aspects of the 
idea of publicness. In doing so, he develops an understanding of the intrinsic 
quality of publicness as a distinctive type of sociability resting on relations of 
call and response. Warner’s starting point is that any public can only “exist by 
virtue of being addressed” (Warner 2002, 67). This doesn’t mean that publics 
just come into existence by virtue of being addressed. When we address others 
in a public register, we are presuming a shared scope of concern that is far 
from certain. The addressees of any public utterance are imaginary, which is 
not to say that they are unreal. If we can say that a public exists only by virtue 
of being addressed, then this implies that an address to an audience only gets 
its public quality by virtue of the type of response it elicits. It depends on 
whether the address resonates with others.  Another way of putting this is to 
say that what constitutes publics is neither an act of address, nor only of 
response, but the relation of attention that is established in the space that 
separates and joins these two acts (ibid., 87). And there is no reason to 
suppose that such relations of attention are contained within scenes of face-to-
face interaction; indeed, there is no reason to suppose that these face-to-face 
encounters are any freer from uncertainty and indeterminacy than stretched-
out, distanciated relationships.   
If the publicness of a discourse depends on establishing a relation of 
attention, then this means that any public is constituted by a spacing between 
discrete but intimately related acts that are separated and bound together in 
temporal relations of anticipation, projection, response and reply. Warner’s 
emphasis on the distinctive temporal qualities of publics and counter-publics 
liberates the disseminating force of publicness that Habermas’ seminal 
account of the public sphere had contained within a circle of dialogue. A 
public, for Warner, is in large part stretched-out across time, in the sense that 
it comes into being and persists by people writing letters in response to 
newspaper stories; or writing reviews of books they have read; or citing those 
books in the things they write themselves; or carrying on the day-to-day talk 
about last night’s telly.  
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The citational pattern is crucial to understanding the value of public ‘space’. 
It connects up to the distinctive type of sociability that is bought into being by 
a public, as distinct from other social forms such as families, parties, 
friendship networks, or bureaucracies. The citational, iterative quality of the 
relations through which public attention is secured underscores the idea that 
when one addresses a public the addressee, intended or otherwise, is actually 
not there, not yet, not at least as a member of a public. This is one implication 
of insisting that publics are imaginary entities. But there is a paradox at work 
here: while one might acknowledge that publics are, in principle, imaginary 
entities, when one actually addresses a public, you have to forget this fact – 
one has to assume the existence of an audience, with certain sorts of social 
characteristics. Any public address that ignores these characteristics is not 
likely to come off successfully - not likely to gain much attention - because it 
will end up being completely out of tune with its potential addressees. Once 
again, we need to emphasise that even though they may be imaginary, publics 
certainly cannot be conjured into existence just by the force of one’s own 
intention (Warner (ibid., 14).   
If there is magic involved in the constitution of publics, it is an imperfect 
kind of magic “because of how much it must presuppose” (ibid., 105). What 
this means is that publics have a kind of double conditionality:  
1). They are self-organised, constituted only through being addressed, but 
they also depend upon pre-existing infrastructures of communication and 
circulation;  
2). They are in principle open to all comers, but they in fact presuppose 
specific criteria of shared identity (ibid., 106). You have to have a good 
idea at least about what might resonate if you are to stand a chance of 
what you have to say actually resonating. But you can never know for 
sure.  
And here we reach the crux of the issue - the exact composition and identity of 
a public is unknown:  
“A public is always in excess of its known social basis. It must be more 
than a list of one’s friends. It must include strangers.” (ibid. 4).  
While the intention of addressing a public presupposes some shared social 
criteria, any successfully constituted public only “comes into being through an 
address to indefinite strangers” (ibid., 120). Warner demonstrates his point by 
reminding us that public discourse has a distinctive grammar. It is as it is once 
both personal and impersonal (ibid., 121). It is in principle addressed to 
anyone, but in a tone of some familiarity, and in a register of concern, as if the 
topic being talked about should matter to addressees. Publics are constituted 
through a pragmatics that sends out its call in a register intended “for-anyone-
as-someone” (Scannell 2000).  
The relationship between presupposing and exceeding shared criteria of 
identity is a defining feature of public discourse (Warner 2002, 105-6). This 
set of paradoxical relations between what is concrete and given on the one 
hand, and what is abstract and imagined on the other, accounts for the queer 
nature of publicness:  
  
16
 
“Public discourse, in the nature of its address, abandons the security of its 
positive, given audience. It promises to address anybody. It commits itself 
in principle to the possible participation of any stranger. It therefore puts 
at risk the concrete world that is its given condition of possibility. This is 
its fruitful perversity.” (ibid, 113).  
Here, then, we glimpse a different style of circulatory space than that 
originally outlined by Habermas. For Warner, public discourse is projective, 
hopeful, crossed by anticipation, and its ongoing accomplishment depends on 
any specific act of addressing others being taken up, thrown into circulation, 
reiterated, passed on, disseminated.  
Warner describes what we might call the performative qualities of 
publicness: publics are constituted by addressing a public, and in this sense, 
any public utterance does what it says, it brings into being what it presupposes 
to already exist as the condition of getting off the ground. The ‘space’ of this 
sort of publicness is a spacing-out of discourse over time, which accounts for 
the sense in which publics are imaginary entities composed of strangers. 
Herein lays the intrinsic value that can be ascribed to publicness: it is a 
modality for actively engaging with strangers, for acting-in-concert with 
others as ends in themselves. Notice, too, that this intrinsic quality of public 
interaction with strangers in a register of familiarity is dependent upon the 
prior existence of other social relations and organisational infrastructures. In 
Warner’s account, publicness feeds off these as its conditions, but only to 
exceed and transform them in the process.  
Warner’s account of publicness is primarily, but not only, focussed on how 
taking seriously the quality of public mediums forces us to think of public 
subjects as particular types of imaginary collectivities. I have focused on the 
intrinsic value of the type of social interaction that inhere in the formal 
characteristics of publicness – publicness as a relation of engaging with others 
as others, as different from oneself, as strangers. Warner does not ignore 
instrumental questions, it’s true, but to consider this dimension of publicness 
more fully, I want to shift attention to John Dewey. It is from Dewey that I 
want to derive a fuller sense of the parasitical qualities of publicness. For 
Dewey, publics are not only dependent on prior formations of social 
interaction, as in Warner, which they also exceed. They are also dependent on 
pre-existing infrastructures of communication and social integration. And 
above all, for Dewey a public is bought into existence because public 
discussion is always about something of general concern, not just about itself. 
For Dewey publics are, as it were, intrinsically instrumental, and herein lies 
their important connection to democratic politics.    
 
5.ii). Publics as communities of the affected 
One way of situating the importance of Dewey’s ideas to understanding the 
relationship between publicness, democracy and geography is by reference to 
a critical question in democratic theory: how to determine who has the right to 
participate in democratic public life?  
Just who belongs to the public whose consent is meant to legitimise 
decisions as democratic? Classically, participation in public life is defined on 
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the basis of membership as a citizen of a territorially defined polity. An 
alternative criterion appeals to a causally-based principle. This makes 
participation in decision-making dependent on the idea of affected interest 
(Shapiro 1999, 38-39). This principle seems well fitted to doing justice to the 
democratic principle that all those people potentially affected by a decision 
have an interest in it. The idea of affected interest also implies a different 
geography of participation. ‘Communities of affected interest’ are not likely to 
be neatly contained within the boundaries of nation-states (nor necessarily 
restricted to only human actors; see Eckersley 2000). We all know that 
decisions made in one place have all sorts of consequential impacts that extend 
far beyond boundaries of this sort. This principle therefore also seems to be 
better suited to taking account of relations of power and their complex 
geographies:   
“The causal principle of affected interest suggests that ideally the 
structure of decision rules should follow the contours of power 
relationships”, and this means that “if you are affected by the results, you 
are presumptively entitled to a say” (Shapiro 2003, 219-220).  
This type of argument about the spatiaility of actions and their unintended 
consequences is also common in geography, where it is used to argue for a 
radical extension of the geographical scope of care, obligation, participation, 
and responsibility (Corbridge 1993, Massey 2004, Smith 1998).   
On its own, though, the causal principle of affected interest might lead us to 
conflate two different forms of solidarity, in so far as it seems to suggest that a 
‘public’ is constituted simply through systems of ‘functional interdependence’. 
This latter idea refers to a type of relationship based on structural connections 
that “join people in a mutuality that is not primarily manifest in their own 
common recognition of it but instead can operate, as it were, behind their 
backs” (Calhoun 2002, 161). This sort of relationship, one that is not chosen 
but which we find ourselves already placed in, might well be one condition for 
the emergence of publics. But in and of itself, it is not equivalent to a public in 
the broad sense we are defining in this chapter. A public is not simply formed 
through relations of necessity that follow from functional integration across 
space and time – they depend on both this sort of solidarity and an element of 
choice (ibid., 163).  
Dewey is often associated with the idea that publics are coterminous with 
spatially extensive communities of affected interest. But he actually sketches a 
more complex understanding of publicness than this at first suggests. Writing 
in the 1920s and 1930s, Dewey focussed attention on the implications for 
democratic politics of the geographical extension and increasing functional 
complexity of social relationships. He argued that the spatial extension of 
transport, communications, economic processes, and trade positively expanded 
the conditions for democratic public life (Barnett 2000b). This extension of 
life over space and time inevitably entangles people into relationships of cause 
and effect, and in particular into relationships in which actions have all sorts of 
indirect consequences:  
“A public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect 
consequences of transactions to such an extent that is deemed necessary 
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to have those consequences systematically cared for” (Dewey 1927, 16-
17).  
This might look like an affirmation of the causal principle of affected interest. 
But actually, Dewey’s primary emphasis is upon not just the extensive and 
indirect consequences of acts. It is, rather, on the perception and recognition of 
these. It is this process that is constitutive of a public. Dewey argued against 
the idea that, in complex social systems, democracy should be reduced to the 
efficient management by experts, supported by occasional acclamation by a 
passive citizenry. He argued that people retained their capacity to act as 
citizens in spatially extensive and functionally complex systems, but he did 
not stake this on their capacity to process lots of information about how their 
actions lead to all sorts of dispersed consequences. This was impossible, but 
this did not militate against the possibility of publics coming into existence. 
Far from it, for Dewey publics emerged precisely when consequences become 
so complex, the numbers of actors involved so large, that people cannot 
accurately calculate how they affect others or will be affected by them (ibid., 
52-53).  
The extension of social life over distanciated, complex systems means that 
people cannot accurately trace the contours of their own implication in distant 
consequences. But it does sensitize them to the idea that they are, nonetheless, 
implicated in this way. The extension of communications, in the broadest 
sense, enabled people to develop “more numerous and varied points of shared 
common interests” (Dewey 1980: 92), and facilitated “freer interaction 
between social groups” (ibid). In short, people’s imaginative horizons are 
expanded, and this is the key mechanism for the transformation of functionally 
integrated systems into publics. This transformation depends not on relations 
of expert knowledge, but on a capacity to imagine one’s implication in wider 
systems of indirect consequences (Goodin 2002). What this means is that a 
public turns out not to be composed only of all those affected by 
consequences; a public emerges only when “the perception of consequences 
are projected in important ways beyond the persons and associations directly 
concerned in them” (Dewey, 1927, 39). And in principle, this means that the 
scope of any public is indeterminate, because once one introduces the idea of 
indirect consequences, the number and location of those affected expands 
beyond the scope of easy comprehension.  
So, for Dewey the conditions for a new type of public life lay in this process 
of spatial and temporal extension of consequences that enable the expansion of 
people’s perception of being part of wider communities of interest. The causal 
principle of affected interest does, then, serve to determine the object of 
matters of public concern in Dewey’s formulation: publics form around the 
shared concern to intervene and ‘take care of’ extensive systems of action and 
their indirect consequences. But the emergence of a public as a subject of 
collective action does not follow automatically from the cognitive 
apprehension of chains of cause and effect. Rather, the extension of 
consequences and affected interests over space and time serves as the vector 
through which people learn to abstract themselves from their own 
perspectives. For Dewey, a public is primarily an imaginative entity:  
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“The idea of a public that responds to events even though most members 
are not immediately affected was Dewey’s formulation of the location of 
the political and of civic virtue” (Wolin, 511).    
Dewey’s account of publicness therefore sketches the outlines of what the title 
of this paper refers to as a parasitical notion of public space. By this, I mean to 
draw attention to how the matters of concern that define the object of public 
interest as well as the styles of engagement through which publics constitute 
themselves as collective subjects both depend on prior processes of 
infrastructural and socio-cultural development. But publicness as such exceeds 
both the infrastructural conditions that generate objects of public concern and 
the forms of social solidarity through which people’s dispositions to public 
engagement are cultivated.  
We can now return to the idea that the notion of a ‘community of affected 
interest’ offers an alternative criteria of participation, one which shifts 
attention away  from the question of ‘who is a member’, the answer to which 
always ends up seeming a little bit arbitrary, and onto to questions of Who is 
Affected? (Shapiro 2003, 223). Geographers are drawn to this ‘affected 
interest’ model because it is easy to think that geography is in a good position 
to answer the second question. Geography can easily re-tool itself as a way of 
tracking chains of cause and effect, actions and their dispersed consequences. 
Unfortunately, the ‘causal’ principle is not quite as straightforward as it seems. 
It’s actually rather difficult to disentangle simple relations of cause and effect, 
actions and consequences, when dealing with complex social, economic, or 
cultural processes. What is more, we might pause for thought before rejecting 
the territorial criteria of participation out of hand. Territorial definitions have 
the advantage of efficiently solving the problem of how to determine rights to 
participate. Any argument against this principle must address the extent to 
which territorial definitions are basic mechanisms for ensuring effective rights 
of equal participation (Saward 1998). Territorial models of citizenship 
presume that any member of a polity has the equal right to participate in 
collective decisions even if they are not directly affected by them. It is this 
principle, in fact, that is crucial to understanding how publics come into being 
on the back, as it were, of other processes of geographical expansion and 
extension. It turns out that nationalism might be the best paradigm available 
for understanding the possibility of the sorts of imaginative action through 
which spatially extensive and temporally durable publics constitute themselves 
(Calhoun 1997).    
In both Warner and Dewey, ‘publicness’ is ascribed to a family of related 
types of action: action-in-concert with others; action undertaken in public, in 
the open; and actions around objects of widely shared concern. And for both 
writers there is also a strong sense that public action is parasitical on the 
material configurations and social relations laid down by other forms of 
activity, in the sense that it is dependent on these as its conditions of 
possibility, as well as in the sense that it is these conditions that in turn 
become the object of transformative public action.  
We have learned from Dewey that an intrinsic feature of the relationship 
between publicness and democracy is that publicness has an instrumental 
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dimension - that is, that public action is about something. This is not all 
publicness is, but an account that diminishes this aspect as somehow intruding 
into authentic publicness is an account that will have difficulty in accounting 
for just why we are always so worried about the question of the public sphere 
in the first place.  
Political philosophers such as Hannah Arendt,  Sheldon Wolin and Claude 
Lefort all tend to expel any instrumental calculation from the realm of 
authentic public action and political activity. This same suspicion informs the 
theories of radical democracy and agonistic democracy developed by writers 
such as Chantal Mouffe and William Connolly who have also attracted the 
attention of geographers in recent years. In this tradition, publicness has no 
object, it isn’t about anything, it is a pure means in itself.  
These theories are helpful because they acknowledge the value of the 
affective dimensions of publicness as an important dimension of political 
action. But they also encourage a style of theoretical evaluation that verges on 
the self-righteous and narcissistic by supposing that public action and politics 
are best thought of as activities of pure self-creation detached from 
instrumental concerns. Public action is made to look like an end in itself. 
These theories put the normative cart before the practical horse (Elster 1983, 
91-100), in that they fail to acknowledge that the qualities of sociable, 
convivial interaction that they propose as the essence of public life depend on 
“a range of decisions, actions, and policies that cannot emerge from the flow 
of everyday sociability alone” (Weintraub 1997, 24). And in this, these 
agonistic, radical theories of publicness and democracy actually converge with 
the more liberal, deliberative theories they often take as their conceptual 
antagonists (Schudson 1997). Both approaches suppose that democracy can do 
without instrumental procedures for making decisions, because they either 
think that this involves an illegitimate closure of the free-play of pluralist 
difference, or because they hope that a deliberative consensus can arrive at 
fully legitimate decisions while leaving no sore losers. And in fundamental 
respects, this shared difficulty with imagining how pluralism and autonomy 
can be squared with binding and legitimate decision-making derives from the 
fact that both deliberative and agonistic theories underplay the temporalities 
that articulate the intrinsic qualities of public life and democratic politics with 
their equally compelling instrumental imperatives (see Barnett 2004, Barnett 
2005, Saward 2003).    
On both the intrinsic and instrumental definitions of publicness outlined 
above - the criterion of openness to initiation of communication by others, and 
the criterion of having to do with the general interest – we can see that the 
idea that public space is ‘material’, where this is supposed to mean spaces of 
co-presence like the street, parks, or the city, or even a causal space of actions 
and consequences, is entirely inadequate for thinking about the relationship 
between publicness and democracy. The sense of spatiality that is best 
adjusted to thinking about this relationship is characterised not by the 
idealisation of dialogue, or of face-to-face theatricality, or urban sociability, 
but by reference to a vocabulary of dissemination, scattering, and dispersal 
(Peters 1999). Addressing a message to others always traverse a spaces full of 
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the hazards of misfire, misunderstanding, and failure. Messages might be 
intercepted by unanticipated addressees in unanticipated places, or by none at 
all:   
“Communication occurs only insofar as the delivery of the message may 
fail: that is, communication takes place only to the extent that there is a 
separation between the sender and the receiver, and this separation, this 
distance, this spacing, creates the possibility for the message not to 
arrive” (Chang 1996, 216). 
If, then, the space of publicness is a circulatory space of indeterminate 
address, this is best exemplified by all those characteristics ascribed by 
Derrida to textuality: drift, dissemination, chance, and by the separations of 
temporal deferral as much as spatial distance (Barnett 1998).   
 
6). Cultivating attention 
So far, I have suggested that public space is best thought of as a circulatory 
space of address, constituted through relationships of attention between 
subjects who approach each other as strangers. But how does this process 
work? How is it possible that a public can be constituted just by being 
addressed? What sort of magic is supposed to be at work here?  
There is one very influential understanding, indebted to poststructuralist 
theories of signification, which holds that the constitution of any collective 
subject must be premised on exclusion. According to this view, an identity can 
only be constructed by projecting an ‘Other’, against which it defines itself, 
and by which it is consequently perpetually threatened. According to Chantal 
Mouffe (1995), any act of political or public speech that posits a collective 
entity – that says ‘We’ – succeeds only because at the same time it posits a 
‘Them’ against which the identity of ‘We’ is both secured.  
Despite its popularity, this theory of differential signification does not 
actually work for words like ‘We’ which are so crucial to public discourse. 
Indeed, one cannot understand the political force of little pronouns like ‘we’, 
‘us’, and ‘them’ by supposing that it does (Barnett 2004a, Taneseni 2005). 
One problem with this understanding is that it supposes that a public is 
constituted through establishing a circular relationship of recognition between 
speakers and addressees. If one were to take this understanding as the model 
for the constitution of a public, then it would seem that a public can be 
conjured into existence simply by the force of shared collective will to share in 
such an identity.  
To suppose that publicness is constituted in this way, through an assertion of 
identity that is secured through a collective act of recognition, is to miss the 
distinctive qualities of publicness as a form of collective endeavour. Any 
public discourse acquires its publicness only in so far as it resonates through 
successive circulations and iterations, but as we have already seen in Section 
5, this implies a movement of opening rather than a moment of closure.  
To put it another way, public speech is not just ‘performative’. Too often, 
the performative dimensions of human activity are still attributed to the force 
of pure creativity. But the performative force of public speech is not only 
illocutionary, to use a technicality from J. L. Austin (1962). The paradigm of 
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an illocutionary act is promising, an act which names what it does. Promising 
is an act in which someone does something in saying something. But public 
discourse, as we have discussed it thus far, also depends on perlocutionary 
acts. These are acts which aim to persuade or convince, warn, or alarm other 
people. They are acts in which something is done by saying something.  
The idea that the constitution of publics depends on the force of 
perlocutionary acts means, amongst other things, that there is an irreducible 
spatial and temporal interval between any act intended to be public, and its 
successful accomplishment as a public act. Just as, for example, the utterance 
“I warn you” does not bring about its effect of warning simply by the force 
with which it is uttered - its success as a warning depends on the 
responsiveness of others – so too public discourse, such as saying ‘We’ in 
certain circumstances, needs to be understood in terms of a series of uncertain 
effects rather than a set of intentional acts with their own inbuilt constitutive 
force of recognition. Which is to say, public discourse does not work 
magically at all, but depends for its felicitous accomplishment on dispositions 
of attentiveness and responsiveness to the needs of others (Cavell 2005).  
The poststructuralist interpretation of public, political speech takes a wrong 
turn in focussing upon the idea that meaning is inherently differential. It 
wrongly assumes that the meaning of a sign, its identity, is determined by its 
negative difference from other signs. This is one source of the idea that any 
invocation of a collective ‘public’ subject must be founded on a dialectic of 
recognition and exclusion. But on the performative, or more specifically 
perlocutionary account sketched above, it seems that Saying ‘We’, understood 
as the paradigm for conjuring publics into being, is a kind of invitation 
addressed to an audience to see themselves as part of this ‘We’. This type of 
public act can only come off because saying ‘We’ is the kind of hazardous, 
chance-ridden gesture that only works by risking not getting any response at 
all, or getting a response from wholly unanticipated quarters. Rather than 
being constituted by exclusion, the constitutive force of public acts derives 
from the irreducible openness to strangers of this sort of discourse. As the 
archetypal public utterance, ‘We’ is only ever addressed to an imaginary 
addressee, to a stranger, since the address itself can only presuppose but not 
determine in advance the identity of those recipients whose assent, by being 
moved to respond, might secure its accomplishment as public. Saying ‘We’ is, 
then, less an assertion of identity as much as it is a claim for attention.  
If public discourse works through this type of call and response dynamic, 
then it means that we should take seriously the idea that publics are things that 
make their appearance through the force of convening, that is, through a set of 
relationships between addressing and responding. ‘Convening’ certainly 
brings to mind the sense that a public is an assembly or gathering of some sort. 
But I use the formula ‘convening publics’ because I want to emphasise the 
active sense of calling on others to gather together, which in turn requires an 
active response to heed any such call. This sense of convening helps us 
appreciate the sense in which publics appear through representative acts being 
spoken for and being spoken to.   
  
23 
 
We saw at the outset of this chapter that publics are always spoken about, 
and more to the point, they are always spoken for. Now, speaking for others 
seems to many academics to be impossible, if not a wholly unjustifiable 
presumption. But I want to follow Stanley Cavell (1979, 18-28; 1969, 67-68), 
who suggests that the possibility of saying ‘We’, or what he calls the 
“arrogation of voice” which is always involved in supposing that one can 
rightfully speak for others, is only considered impossible or scandalous 
because we forget about the relationship between speaking for and speaking to 
others. And, in turn, we tend to think that speaking to others is much simpler 
than it is. We forget that it is risky, hazardous, that it only works by risking the 
chance of misfires and infelicitous outcomes. We need to keep both points in 
mind if we are to appreciate why the idea of ‘convening publics’ makes a 
difference to the sorts of questions we ask about public action: the first point 
reminds us that public discourse is, pre-eminently, discourse addressed to 
others; the second point reminds us that any such address to others only comes 
off as a public act because of a relationship of attention between speakers and 
addressees that is constituted by the response of the latter.  
So in speaking of ‘convening publics’, the emphasis should be on the active 
sense of convening, rather than a sense of a convention already successfully 
gathered together, or conforming to a rule already agreed upon. The activity of 
public-making inheres not in gathering, nor even in assembling, but in this 
activity of convening, that is, in calling out to others, attracting their attention. 
When one remembers the hazardous quality of the process of speaking to 
others, one can begin to better understand how speaking for others is not a 
zero-sum game of silencing or exclusion, but an invitation, an opening up of a 
scene of claims and counter-claims.   
The idea of ‘convening publics’ is, then, intimately related to the queer force 
of ‘perlocutionary effects’ – ‘doing by saying’, as distinct from ‘doing in 
saying’. Cavell calls perlocutionary speech a form of ‘passionate utterance’ – a 
form that engages addresser and addressee in relations of response that are 
expressive, that move the participants. This relates to the question of whether 
there are limits to the type of expression that can, in practice, perform the role 
of convening public attention. One of the criticisms levelled at political 
philosophers like Habermas and Rawls is that, in their influential formulations 
of public deliberation, they circumscribe the styles of communication that are 
legitimately allowed to be deployed. While both writers emphasise the 
importance of publicity as a crucial medium in democratic life, they also 
presume that public deliberation aimed at sustaining democracy and justice 
should be governed by the norms of civil conversation - the idea that people 
entering into public life should adopt as disinterested a perspective as possible 
in order to consider what is in the general interest. 
The criticism levelled at both Habermas and Rawls is that these norms of 
rational, argumentative deliberation tend to elevate forms of discourse that are 
formal, general, dispassionate and disembodied (cf. Dahlberg 2005). Feminist 
theorists point out that defined in this way, public deliberation “does not open 
itself equally to all forms of making claims and giving reasons” (Young 1997, 
64). This in turn means that some categories of person, and some forms of 
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injustice, might be inadvertently silenced in this type of idealised public 
deliberation. It is on these grounds that Cavell (1988, 101-126) takes issue 
with the image of the ‘conversation of justice’ in Rawls’ work, according to 
which the benchmark of reasonable public action oriented towards justice is 
the commitment to giving principled expression to ones’ grievances. Cavell 
suggests that there are modes of claiming injustice which exceed rational 
discourse. These claims can take the form of a cry of frustration or a scream of 
anger. They are, in short, types of passionate utterance, ones which work as 
much by moving people as by their rational coherence. Cavell’s point against 
Rawls is that he does not allow for the full range of ways of articulating one’s 
grievances and feelings about relationships with other people - ways that 
exceed rules, knowledge, and principles. Amongst these, one might include 
non-deliberative modes such as gesture, jokes, poetry, or storytelling (Young 
1997, 2001). 
The point of this argument is not to wholly abandon norms of deliberation, 
justification, and reason giving. To suppose that this is the reason for affirming 
the affective qualities of communication would run the risk of reducing public 
action to nothing more than the expression of purely personal moral 
convictions which are considered valid in and of themselves, that is, beyond 
the scope for transformation through public encounters. But as we have 
already seen above, a crucial aspect of the democratic value of publicness is 
that it is about something, about matters over which people have good reason 
to be concerned with and care about together. The affective styles of 
publicness act as supplements to rather than substitutes for cognitive 
reasonable dispositions of public discourse (Woodward 2004).   
Cavell’s analysis of Rawls’ account of the conversation of justice is 
concerned with elaborating the multiplicity of ways through which the 
intelligibility of selves and others to one another, and a mutual 
accommodation despite their differences, is made possible. In arguing that 
claims to justice are shown as well as rationally asserted, Cavell maintains a 
commitment to the idea that political action is irreducibly a form of public 
conduct that depends on scenes of address and response. But publicness is no 
longer restricted to forms of dispassionate deliberation – the role of affective, 
passionate utterances is just as important to democratic public life. 
The account of the irreducible relationship between publicness, passion, and 
democratic action developed in this section suggest a preliminary answer to 
Offe’s question posed in Section 2. He asks what sorts of interventions in the 
field of ‘taste’ are legitimate in a democratic culture that puts a high value on 
people’s autonomy. One answer might be that efforts to cultivate virtues of 
‘attentiveness’ can be justified in so far as they are crucial to maintaining the 
sorts of ordinary activities through which public life is sustained. If publicness 
depends on relations of attention, then measures which aim to sustain both the 
affective and cognitive dimensions of care and concern might be not only 
justifiable, but also essential for underwriting the relational value of autonomy 
itself, in so far as this involves a capacity to reason with and respond to others.  
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7). Thinking publicly 
So, after all this, what is publicness, and how does it relate to democracy? 
Ferree et al (2002, 316) suggest that there are, at least, four different criteria 
upon which the relationships between public communication and democracy 
can be evaluated:  
1. The first criterion focuses on who participates. For example, should 
democracy be thought of as a system of elite, expert rule regulated by 
elections, or whether it should be more participatory?  
2. The second criterion focuses on what sort of process is taken to 
embody public communication. For example, what are the relative 
merits of a ‘market-place of ideas’ model compared to more 
deliberative practices?  
3. A third criterion focuses on how ideas should be presented in public 
communications. For example, how far should norms of detachment, 
disinterest, and civility govern public debate, or how far are forms of 
narrative and non-deliberative symbolic acts not only legitimate but 
essential elements of democratic public communication?  
4. And finally, the fourth criterion focuses on the outcomes of the 
relationships between discourse and decision-making. For example, is 
consensus around decisions the primary goal of public 
communication, and should debate be restricted once a decision has 
been made, or is this emphasis on consensus and closure 
systematically undemocratic?  
This chapter has touched on aspects of each of these criteria:  
1. I have presumed in favour of an expansionary understanding of who 
should be involved in democratic decision-making, while recognising 
that a certain division of labour between roles is both inevitable and 
valuable, in complex societies.  
2. I have also presumed in favour of an expansive, deliberative 
conception, while trying to acknowledge that market-led models of 
private preference do carry an important normative lesson, in so far 
as they are guided by a presumption in favour of respecting people’s 
own opinions as to their best interests and by a healthy scepticism 
about paternalist interventions in the name of others.  
3. And I have favoured a notion of public communication that 
acknowledges the importance of non-deliberative, affective styles of 
presentation, but without supposing that these are wholly opposed to 
rational, reasonable, cognitive forms of justification.  
4. It has been the last of these four criteria, though, that this chapter has 
given most attention to. This is because quite a lot of research in 
geography forgets that the reason for worrying about publicness is 
because of the relationship between public communication and 
democratic decision-making and accountability.  
It is because he keeps this relationship constantly in focus that the work of 
Habermas remains so compelling when it comes to thinking about issues of 
public life and democracy. Habermas might well over-rationalise the style of 
communication that is required for public life to contribute to thorough-going 
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democratisation, but his project retains its power in spite of this precisely 
because he keeps his eye on the key relationship between publicness and 
democracy - that is, the relationship between chatting, joking, deliberating, 
and the problems of legitimate and just popular rule.  
By emphasising that the democratic value of publicness inheres in the 
quality of this relationship, I mean to suggest that the democratic qualities of 
any public sphere should not be judged narrowly by whether it promotes 
rational deliberation, or alternatively by whether on its own it is accessible or 
inclusive. Rather, what is crucial is the degree to which the overall network of 
public practices enables people to “keep tabs on the political world” 
(Schudson 1998, 238). The fundamental issue at stake in evaluating the 
democratic qualities of public life is  
“whether, when an issue arises, citizens have various effectual access 
points to governmental decision-makers. The effective operation of a 
public sphere depends also on whether, through the networks of talk, 
complaint, letters, petitions, interest groups, parties, suits, demonstrations, 
and picket lines, people feel they can and actually can move issues onto 
the public agenda” (ibid).  
The main point of this chapter has been to suggest that when assessing this 
question, we need to focus on a set of relations between different types of 
action, some more open and fluid than other, more strategic forms.  
I have argued for an idea of publicness that reorients our attention to 
thinking about public space as any communicative space of address-and-
response. Rather than modelling public space on the idea of gathering and 
assembly in the presence of others, we should look at the ways in which 
publics are convened through practices of dissemination, dispersal, and 
scattering. This notion of the convening of publics is related to the sense that 
any ‘public’ always holds something in reserve, because the public is always 
spoken for and spoken to, which is another way of saying that ‘it’ might 
always answer back in unexpected ways. The public is, therefore, not to be 
found anywhere special, it has no proper place, nor any exemplary spatiality. 
As we saw above, publics can’t come into existence without presupposing 
infrastructures of communications and patterns of social interaction, but 
neither are these material or social configurations are in themselves publics. A 
public emerges when these presupposed forms and patterns are exceeded, 
made strange, and used as a medium to imaginatively project towards an 
unknown addressee, to invite them to share one’s concerns, to care about 
things together.  
We need to retain an appreciation of the magic that is involved in carrying 
off the acts that help make up and sustain democratic publicness. Publics are 
called into existence, they are convened, which is to say that they are sustained 
by establishing relations of attention whose geographical configurations are 
not given in advance.  
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